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Abstract 
Despite a long-standing controversy about aid-effectiveness in general and the impact of aid-
dependency on governance in particular, little is known on the effect of donors policies on 
civic agency for democratization in aid dependent autocratic regimes. In this study it is 
argued that the long-term effects of double-talk of donors, who openly promote democracy 
and freedom but covertly follow overriding hidden interest, are a neglected source of failure 
of civic protest and democratic revolutions in autocratic regimes. The differing outcome of 
‘democratic revolutions’ in Togo and Burkina Faso – both ‘aid darlings’ for decades - serves to 
substantiate this thesis. A systematic and holistic consideration is necessary for an unbiased 
evaluation of the hidden adverse impact of aid on collective action at the grass-roots. 
Therefore, a rethinking of temporal and disciplinary ‘fault lines’ in development politics as 
well as in development studies is essential.  
 
Résumé 
Le double langage des bailleurs sape la responsabilité civique africaine contre des régimes 
autocrates: Étude comparative au Burkina Faso et au Togo : En dépit d'une longue 
controverse à propos de  l’ efficacité de l'aide en général et de l'impact de la dépendance à 
l'égard  de l’aide sur la gouvernance en particulier, on en sait peu sur l'effet à long-terme des 
politiques des bailleurs  sur la capacité civique d’agir en faveur de  la démocratisation des  
régimes autocrates  dépendants de l’aide. Dans cette étude, notre hypothèse  est  que le 
double langage des bailleurs de fonds qui met  ouvertement en avant la démocratie et la 
liberté mais suit secrètement des intérêts plus  déterminants/lucratifs , est une source 
négligée de l'échec des protestations de la société civile et des révolutions démocratiques au 
sein  des régimes autocratiques africains. Les différents résultats des «révolutions 
démocratiques» au Togo et au Burkina Faso – les deux «chouchous des bailleurs» ces 
dernières décennies – confirment  cette hypothèse. Une évaluation de  l'impact latent de 
l'aide sur l'action collective au niveau local n’est possible que par une approche systématique 
et complète de la situation . Ainsi, un réexamen des lignes de faille au cours du temps et 
disciplinaires tant au niveau des  politiques de développement que dans les études sur le  
développement s’avère essentiel.  
 
Keywords: Development cooperation, democratization, civic agency, autocratic regimes, 
Burkina Faso, Togo, West Africa, ODA, aid dependency  
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1. Introduction 
 
Much has been written on the impact of aid on governance and democratization in Africa 
but little is known on the effect of aid on civic agency against autocratic African rulers. There 
exists a long-standing controversy whether official development aid (ODA) could improve 
effectively governance or not (Bingsten & Tengstam 2015; Birsdall & Kharas 2010; Bräutigam 
& Knack 2004; Collier 2006; Knack 2004; 2001). According to Djankov et al (2008) aid 
constitutes an even bigger curse than oil. However, other studies suggest that aid can play a 
positive role at least under certain conditions, namely when its components are considered 
(Ear 2007). Aid was effective at promoting democratic transitions during the second wave of 
democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s at least in some aid dependent countries 
that faced deep economic crisis and public discontent. But it failed in most cases to 
consolidate democracy and good government. At best it contributed to institutionalizing 
procedural multi-party systems and formal democracy, however in most cases it did not 
succeed  to change informal politics that upheld autocratic rule. Most empirical studies on 
the determinants of aid conclude that geo-political ties and self-interest of donors still 
outweigh other factors, including need of the recipient countries although the latter 
attracted growing attention since the end of the Cold War (Rogerson & Steensen, 2009:1). 
Hoeffler and Outram (2008) found that almost half of the predicted value of aid was 
determined by donor-specific factors, 36% by needs, 16% by donor’s self-interest. 
Recipient’s performance, measured by growth, democracy and human rights, accounted for 
just 2 %. 
Large amounts of aid to countries with weak institutions can even create those institutional 
problems that lead to ineffectiveness (Bräutigam, 2000). Apparently, there exists a trade-of 
between the objectives of aid promoted economic growth and democratization, even if 
inclusive growth had been targeted (Resnick & de Walle 2013; Resnick 2012: 2-3). In 
addition, aid unpredictability weakens governance by providing incentives to corrupt leaders 
to engage in rent-seeking (Kangoye 2013). A recent comparative analysis of EU development 
aid in 17 African countries revealed that strategic allies as well as good growth performers 
were shielded against necessary sanctions, actually required because of undemocratic 
governance and human rights violations (Del Biondo 2015). Competing commercial and 
strategic interests prevent donors from making a more positive contribution (Brown 2004). 
Due to internal strives between different EU departments and member countries as well as a 
rather technocratic bias the EU had problems to render aid more effective (Hackenesch, 
2015; Kohnert 2004). 
Concerning authoritarian political systems, many donors prefer to give aid to civic 
groups, but whether these act in general more efficiently than state institutions is open to 
question (Kohnert 2004a). The Paris Declaration of 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) 
and the “Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation” (2011) were important 
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steps to make aid more efficient by a better coordination and harmonization of donor 
policies (Davies & Klasen 2013), meant last but not least to reduce the risk of elite capture 
(Bigsten & Tengstam 2015:75). Equally important were the focus on recipient country 
ownership and promotion of inclusive development partnerships, thus opening up also for 
new players from the civil society.  
Nevertheless, the half-life period of the institutional memory both of development 
agencies and related research and evaluation institutions is still quite short. In contrast, 
failures of development projects and misguided development policies remain reflected 
usually by the local population concerned over generations. However, its long-lasting impact 
is considered by the donors only occasionally. A systematic and holistic consideration is a 
perquisite for an unbiased evaluation of the impact of aid at the grass-roots. Therefore, a 
rethinking of temporal and disciplinary ‘fault lines’ in development politics as well as in 
development studies is essential too. Last, but not least, a major change in the methodology 
of development planning is required. This is closely connected with a shift of emphasis in the 
approach to development cooperation, away from project service delivery, towards 
supporting the socio-cultural and political environment of the recipient communities. This 
demands a reorientation of aid management, away from the blinkers of result-orientated 
planning towards participative organizational cultures of learning embracing all partners on 
a level playing field (Kohnert 2006:1; Kohnert & Preuss 2003)2.  
In contrast to the rich body of literature on the influence of aid on governance, the 
impact of aid (directly or indirectly) on civic agency against autocratic rule has received little 
scholarly attention. Much has been written about the Arab spring and its repercussions on 
Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Burundi, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Togo) and elsewhere. However, the 
impact of aid on civic agency is mentioned only casually if at all in the studies named above 
(Resnick 2012:4, 7, 10-12) and more explicitly by Blair (2004) and Hearn & Robinson (2000). 
Resnick (2012; Resnick & de Walle, 2013) proposed a typology of protest wave outcomes, 
including democratic revolutions, democratic reform movements and stolen revolutions. 
Most of these protest waves failed, less than 29% succeeded, i.e. improved democracy. In 
addition, civil society organizations act not necessarily pro-democracy, even if they pretend 
                                                          
2
 In this respect, the new EU policy on civil society as implemented by the Dinika-program in the case of 
Madagascar could serve as guideline. Dinika (meaning consultation or dialogue in Malagasy) is a civil society 
support program meant to establish a relationship of trust by inviting all civil society actors to become key 
players and to take ownership of the program. “Not limited solely to merely funding CSOs, the EU also seeks to 
use Dinika to strengthen civil society’s institutional presence through initiatives carried out by civil society itself, 
moving away from the service provider model. The programme adopts a flexible ‘learning-by-doing approach’ 
and is supported by a team of facilitators. … (it) elaborate(s) the ‘civil society roadmap’ for a strategic 
engagement with the civil society. … the road map reflects the true expectations of civil society translated into 
an action plan and an implementation timetable via more suitable modalities of support, defining the results to 
be achieved.” (Karroum&Fernagu-Bialais 2015:1) 
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to belong to grass-roots protest movements3. Recent scholarly investigations showed a 
rather ambiguous situation. CSOs in developing countries are not necessarily to be 
considered as the cradle of democratization. On the contrary, many are actively backing 
despotic regimes (Wischermann et al 2015). Why then do several protest movements and 
CSOs fail? Is there a common rationale behind this failure. This is still an open question. The 
subsequent study is meant to contribute to its solution.  
That being said, I should like to introduce shortly some underlying assumptions and 
definitions. It seems reasonable to assume that a positive impact of aid on civic agency is c. 
p. more pronounced in aid dependent than in resource rich authoritarian regimes because 
the latter are less prone to political pressure attached to the conditionality of aid. In 
addition, multi- and bilateral ODA is c. p. less likely to build-up civic agency against despotic 
rulers than that of international non-government organizations (NGOs) because non-state 
agencies, like the political foundations in Germany, might have more leeway vis à vis 
assistance of political opponents than state institutions. 
‘Aid dependency’ is a multidimensional category and difficult to measure. There exist 
no single agreed definition of highly aid dependent countries. Following Bräutigam (2000:2), 
I shall use a simple quantitative measure in the subsequent chapters, i.e. countries receiving 
aid at levels of more than ten percent of GNI for more than four subsequent years on the 
medium and long run as a proxy 4.  
The concept of ‘civil society’ gained momentum in the post Cold-War period that 
tried to open society against autocracy and one-party rule. Civil society Organizations (CSOs) 
and African social movements were endowed an important role in opposing autocratic 
regimes, notably in the African context where informal politics are crucial for the interaction 
between the state and its citizens (Obadare & Willems 2014:3; Eberlei 2014). The 
development of civic agency has even been seen by some scholars as the central political 
                                                          
3
 In Burkina Faso for example, Herman Badolo, the leader of the anti-referendum collective that opposed the 
autocratic president’s attempts to extend his rule and founder of the l'Alliance pour la défense de la démocratie 
(ADP), was accused in the aftermath of the failed reactionary coup of September 2015 of backing the coup 
leaders (“Burkina : deux leaders politiques proches de l'ex-président Compaoré interpellés”, Voice of America, 
French service, 6 Oct. 2015). 
4
The ratio of aid to GNI is used in general by the World Bank as a measure of recipient country’s dependency on 
aid. These aid ratios tend to be much higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions. Changes in the aid 
dependency ratio depend on both the numerator (aid) and the denominator (GNI). Thus, the rise in the 1980s 
does reflect not necessarily increasing aid flows but also diminishing GNI in many African countries suffering 
from deteriorating terms of trade and falling incomes in the 1980s. In addition, aid influx and dependency does 
not necessarily reflect the recipient’s needs but it could also reveal donor preferences out of other foreign 
policy reasons (World Bank – World Development Indicators). “On average, low-income countries received just 
under one percent of GNP in aid in 1997. But aid equaled 10 percent or more of GNP in more than 30 countries 
with populations over 1 million. Trends in aid as a percentage of GNP indicate that aid intensity has been on 
the rise since 1975, although it appears to have leveled off slightly since 1992.” (Bräutigam 2000: 2) 
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problem of the 21st century5. However, the normative concept of ‘civic agency’ is not 
straightforward. It is related to Western rights-based views, notably, on the relationship 
between polity and the state in general and democracy in particular (Fowler 2009:150-151). 
Thus, the ascription of civic agency is dependent last, but not least on power relations on the 
continuum from a local to a global order and thus on the signification of labelling 6.  
As a rule, civic agency in autocratic regimes is met by repression. Below I prefer to 
use an inclusive definition of repression as "any action by another group which raises the 
contender's cost of collective action" (Till 1978:100, quoted by Earl 2003:46). In this sense 
repression has multiple dimensions that involve not just the state, but also private 
institutions and agents, as well as different modes of repression, either by coercion or by 
channeling, and hidden vs. observable repressive actions, as explained in detail by Jennifer 
Earl (2003). The crux is that generally donors more often than not do not bother or do not 
spot and understand indirect and hidden forms of repression and therefore do not act 
adequately against it. 
In the following I shall focus on a comparative study of two neighboring West African 
countries, both ‘aid darlings’ with a rich tradition in grass-root protest against autocratic 
rulers that resulted in different outcomes. That in Burkina Faso succeeded whereas the 
popular protests in Togo failed. The question is, what made the difference and what are the 
lessons learned ?  
2. Comparative analyses of Burkina Faso and Togo 
 
Both Burkina Faso (BF) and Togo were relatively (in comparison to other LDCs) ‘over-aided’ 
in view of its institutional performance over decades: ODA as % of GNI received averaged 
11.7% for BF and 10.1% for Togo (1980 to 2013; cf. Table 1, Annex). Both regimes obtained 
most of the time legitimacy rather by external powers and foreign assistance than by their 
own people. Civic and political action against autocratic rule has been a recurrent feature of 
domestic policy in both countries. At least three peak-waves of democratic protest in Togo 
                                                          
5
 “The central problem of the 21st century is the development of civic agency. Civic agency is the capacity of 
human communities and groups to act cooperatively and collectively on common problems across their 
differences of view. It involves questions of institutional design (that is, how to constitute groups, institutions, 
and societies for effective and sustainable collective action) as well as individual civic skills. Civic agency can 
also be understood in cultural terms, as practices, habits, norms, symbols and ways of life that enhance or 
diminish capacities for collective action.” “Building civic agency: the public-work approach”. Harry C. Boyte, 21 
November 2007. 
6
 Moncrieffe & Eyben, 2007, quoted in Fowler 2009, 151. - Below I shall refer to Alan Fowler’s working 
definition: "Civic agency is a predisposition toward, and a capability for, leading life together with others in a 
society and being concerned for the whole. Agency which is considered civic incorporates a basic principle of an 
equitable, democratic society." (Fowler, A. 2009:151).  
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and BF have been identified (Franklin 2014): In Togo 1991, 2005, 2010 and in BF 1999, 2002, 
2011. Whereas civic agency gathered a strong momentum in BF and finally overthrew the 
autocratic ruler on 31 October 2014, it was frustrated after repeated ‘democratic 
revolutions’ against the despotic Gnassingbé-Clan whose power was consolidated over 
decades by donor support. However, whether the ‘democratic revolution’ in BF could serve 
as model and example for other African countries is open to question (Van Wyk 2015). 
 
(1) Case study Burkina Faso 
a. Long-term aid dependency matters  
Burkina Faso has never seen a peaceful transition of power since independence. It counts 
among the eight poorest countries of the world. It realized a per capita income of $ 670 in 
2013, but growth was not inclusive with a poverty rate of about 46% in 2009. According to 
the Human Development Index (2014) the country ranked 181st out of 187 countries.  
Aid dependency of BF during the last decades was generally high but especially 
pronounced during the 1990s with an average of 16,1% of GNI (cf. Tab. 1). In most years of 
the 2000s and probably also of the 1990s ODA received was equal or surpassed central 
government expense, financed by the government’s own resources (Tab. 2). Aid was given 
by a total of over 100 donors in the country, and BF receives a large share of its aid as 
general budget support since the reorientation of donors aid policy in 2004 (WB 2009:25). 
Since independence BF and the former colonial power France continued a kind of 
patron-client relationship, basically based on  trade and aid (Rupley et al 2013:43-48). France 
was the most important donor of bilateral aid. French aid represented about 25% of total aid 
received up to the mid 1990s (Gabas et al 1997:49). Paris mostly opposed political 
conditionality if the latter did not correspond with its national self-interest and for example 
almost never included human rights clauses (Felice 2015:38). The general approach of 
bilateral project aid was centralized7 and dominated by a subculture of economists and 
diplomats (Felice 2015:37), with an clear economistic bias and orientated versus 
modernization and technology transfer. Double talk prevailed in relation to the overall aims 
of development assistance (apart from military cooperation). Improvement of the living 
conditions of ordinary citizens was generally the declared aim8, however this was 
subordinated to overriding national, commercial and geo-political interests of the Messieurs 
                                                          
7
 “The central steering of aid projects hinders a general domestic approach to development actions and 
problems.” (Gabas et al 1998:49) 
8
 BF still belongs to the 16 priority countries suffering from poverty (PPPs). “France focuses its efforts on 
solidarity grants. It mobilizes its bilateral and multilateral instruments to help meet all of its development policy 
objectives, including: The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), economic development, democratic 
governance and rule of law, Preservation of environmental capital.” (France Diplomatie, 2015). 
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Afrique and the WAEMU (Kohnert 2005). Thus, French ODA fell sharply during the Sankara-
era (1983-87) that did not suit French national interest as seen by Paris (Gabas, J.J. et al 
1997:43-48). France ranks so far still at the bottom of international ranking in aid 
transparency (Barbière 2014). 
In a coup d’ état of 1987 Blaise Compaoré, supported by France, seized power from his 
murdered predecessor Thomas Sankara. The coup was justified by Compaoré in saying that 
Sankara had jeopardized foreign relations with France and neighboring Côte d'Ivoire (BF-
wikipedia), one of the pillars of the pré-carré of French foreign policy in Africa. The fact, that 
Compaoré could stay in power over 27 years was again due last, but not least, to the 
unwavering support of major donors, above all France.  
 
b. The development of civic agency in Burkina Faso 
Under the pressure of a popular protest movement Compaoré fled the country with French 
assistance on 31 October 2014 after 27 years of autocratic rule. This was the second time in 
the country’s history that radical masses induced the end to a despotic regime. The first 
insurrection of the Burkinabé people took place on 3 January 1966 putting an end to the 1st 
republic (Chouli, 2014). 
These popular protest movements were enabled by a deeply engrained civic ‘counter public 
sphere’ (Gegenöffentlichkeit, Oskar Negt) that the Burkinabé had developed since colonial 
times which had strong undercurrents against all forms of neo-colonialism (Chouli 2014a: 
148). The driving forces and ideologies of this civic Gegenöffentlichkeit came to the forefront 
in its most visible form during the short reign of Sankara and left a permanent impression on 
the country so far (Haskin 2015). The quest for a "democratic and popular revolution", 
strongly influenced by leftist and pan-Africanist ideas, was the main pillar of Sankarism. This 
has little to do with Western concepts of liberal democracy and human rights but rather with 
self-reliance, inclusive growth ‘from below’, personal integrity of political leaders and 
national African dignity, as envisaged by Sankara, when he renamed Upper Volta (1984) in 
Burkina Faso, i.e. “The Land of Upright Men”.  
Many ordinary Burkinabé citizen still today regard development under Sankara a great 
success despite undeniable human rights abuses. 9 He became the hero of the men on the 
streets, the jobless school leavers, the oppositional Young Turks and last, but not least of 
modern griots like the rap singer ‘Smockey’ who co-founded the non-violent Burkinabé 
                                                          
9
 “The infant mortality rate was brought down to less than 150 out of 1.000 births; millions of vaccinations were 
given; women were given a comprehensive set of legal rights and were granted government representation. 
Perhaps most amazingly, the redistribution of land away from feudal lords made food production so efficient 
that within four years, Burkina Faso went from heavy dependence of foreign aid for basic nutrition to running a 
food surplus.” (Haskin 2015:1). 
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protest movement Balai citoyen (civic broom) and the Africa wide platform Tournons la page 
(let’s turn the tide) that established a branch also in Togo (Commeillas, 2015). Thus allusions 
to Sankarism became the moral driving force behind the democratic revolution in 2014 
(Frére et al 2015: 301-04; Haskin 2015).  
In a nutshell, the civic Gegenöffentlichkeit in BF was developed in contrast, if not in open 
opposition to the foreign aid policy of donors who assisted their ‘aid darling’ BF massively 
over decades as explained above. Civic agency developed in spite of the official development 
rhetoric that became progressively participative and pro-poor orientated in the course of the 
past decades. However, although major donors increasingly try to assist civic movements in 
LDCs this is hardly possible without the consent of the regime in place. Yet, despotic regimes 
are suspicious vis à vis such endeavors and have a close eye that only those CSO get foreign 
assistance that constitute no danger to their own power base.  
Nevertheless, donors self-interest and double talk is only one important, although neglected 
factor among others that obstruct civic agency to develop. Why then, the civic protest 
movements in BF succeeded in toppling an autocratic regime despite countervailing donor 
policies and in Togo it did not?  
Mass protest both in BF and Togo were triggered last, but not least by trans-national factors, 
like the Sahel drought in the 1970s and 1980s and the aftermath of the 2008 global financial 
crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa. However, these protest should not be interpreted just as local 
reaction to overpowering global forces. In view of the worldwide spread of political concepts 
of good governance and the responsibility of own governments to tackle global crisis the 
construction of close linkages of responsibility by drivers of change like the rap singer 
‘Smockey’10 who spearhead the mass protest became part of the game (Engels, 2015a:181; 
2015b; 2015).  
However, on 16 September 2015, General Gilbert Diendéré, long-term chief of the 
security service und commander of the presidential guard (Régiment de sécurité 
présidentielle, RSP) of Compaoré, staged a coup d’état. Diendéré, still éminence grise of the 
RSP since his dismissal as chief of the RSP by the transitory government in Nov. 2014, was 
the commander of the unit which killed Sankara in 1987 and thereby initiated the coup 
d’état of Compaoré. Moreover, he was accused of being involved in the assassination of the 
journalist Norbert Zongo, director of the weekly L’Indépendant in 1998 by the RSP which 
triggered widespread civil protest. Diendéré, who was still in charge of the anti-terrorist unit 
was said to maintain excellent relations to French and American military networks. The 
renewed coup of 2015 came after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended 
the disbanding of the presidential guard and the exclusion of discredited key allies of ousted 
                                                          
10
 “Popular music, as a discursive terrain, is a site at which power is enacted, acknowledged, accommodated, 
signified, contested, and resisted” (Averill 1997: xi‐xv; cf. Kohnert 2011a; Prause, 2013). 
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Compaoré from the forthcoming elections. Again, civic movements like Balai Citoyen 
organized widespread popular resistance and were joint in its call by trans-national networks 
in- and outside Africa. One week later, the coup-leaders gave up under the pressure both of 
the civil society resistance movements and that of the national army and the international 
community. Diendéré admitted during a press-conference on 23 September: “We saw what 
happened. We knew that the people were not favorable. That's why we have simply 
abandoned »11. Michel Kafando, the president of the interim government, reinstalled on 23 
September, seconded "We are proud of the mobilisation and fearlessness of the people of 
Burkina Faso, in particular of its youth, whose determination has stopped the coup 
succeeding.” (BBC-news Africa, 24.09.15). Although the coup and its background still await 
more detailed scholarly analyses, preliminary findings indicate that grass-root civic protest 
movements, especially of the youth, that succeeded in encouraging the regular army to side 
with the protesters, were more effective in restoring democracy than both the actions of the 
power-hungry elite and opposition by the donor community 12. This was the second time 
within a year that the pro-active Gegenöffentlichkeit of BF ousted their autocratic rulers.  
All the same, there were more specific common causes of popular protest movements 
in BF and Togo like the lack of prospects of jobless school leavers, rising food and fuel prices 
and the deteriorating situation of the poor and the descending lower middle class. However, 
the mass protest in BF had its peculiarities that make it unlikely to be shared by other African 
countries. It was not just a protest against autocratic rule and denied human rights but also 
an aspiration to regain the progress experienced during the glorious times of Sankara, 
whether unduly transfigured or not (Haskin 2015). 
 
(2) Case study Togo 
a. Long-term aid dependency matters 13 
Civic agency in Togo is not to be understood without recourse to Togo’s history of 
development co-operation since independence (1960). The aftermath of an unholy alliance 
of misguided post-colonial Africa policy over decades and the quest of African autocrats for 
unlimited personal power still impedes the development of a powerful and challenging 
Gegenöffentlichkeit in Togo .  
                                                          
11
 “« Le coup d’État s’est fait compte tenu d’un certain nombre de raisons que nous avons évoquées lors de la 
proclamation (du putsch). Nous avons vu ce qui s’est passé. Nous avons su que le peuple n’était pas favorable. 
C’est pour ça que nous avons tout simplement abandonné » (Jeune Afrique, 23. Sept. 2015) 
12
 See BBC-news-Africa: “Seven lessons from Burkina Faso's seven-day coup.” 24 September 2015 and AC 2015.  
13 To keep references in this paper in reasonable limits and to prevent overlength of the paper, references 
on the political situation in Tog are mainly restricted to earlier own publications of the auhtor; for more 
detailed references please consult these publications listed in the bibliography. 
D. Kohnert: Donor’s double talk undermines African agency 
10 
The murder of its first president, Sylvanus Olympio, on 13 January 1963 by a group of 
Togolese veterans of the French colonial army, led by Sergeant Etienne Gnassingbé (later 
called Eyadéma) and tolerated, if not instigated, by the former French colonial power, 
opened up a Pandora’s box. It was the first violent coup in the history of independent sub-
Saharan Africa. Although unanimously condemned by the donor community and the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), both turned back to business as usual soon (Kohnert 
2011). The autocratic rule of Eyadéma, formally installed in 1967, was generously supported 
by major donors, notably the former colonial powers France and Western Germany. Togo’s 
apparent stability, its capitalist orientation and unwavering backing of Western positions in 
East-West cleavages, like the Hallstein Doctrine, meant to prevent international recognition 
of East Germany, were the main reasons. Thus, Togo was put on the drip of development aid 
for decades 14.  
Up to the end of the 1980s donors followed Eyadéma voluntarily in labeling Togo the 
“Switzerland of Africa” out of opportunistic reasons. However, Eyadéma’s economic policy 
was neither development-oriented nor did the apparent domestic tranquility correspond to 
peaceful political cohabitation. It resembled rather graveyard peace, as revealed by the 
Sovereign National Conference of 199115. In addition, economic growth was rather 
externally driven then due to the government’s own efforts. Togo gained relative prosperity 
up to the early 1980s mainly because of its role as a transit-economy for neighboring 
countries. This included not only landlocked Sahel-countries like Burkina Faso or Niger, but 
also Ghana and above all Nigeria which followed an import-substitution policy. Therefore, 
the effective demand for consumer goods of Togo’s neighbors, was redirected to the 
informal (underground) market networks at Lomé.  
                                                          
14
 Compared with public revenue, excluding grants of other governments or international aid 
organizations, ODA to Togo averaged to 62% between 1985 to 1992; in the following years (1993 to 
2002) it decreased only slightly to 57% (World Bank: African Development Indicators, various years, 
Washington/DC: World Bank). Bilateral ODA of the Federal Republic of Germany (Western Germany) was 
given generously and out of proportion. It amounted to DM 600 Mio. between 1960 to 1989, 
supplemented by debt cancellation of DM 295.5 Mio. Even the formal disengagement of Western ODA 
from 1993 to 2008, because of gross human rights violation and bad government of the Eyadéma Regime, 
was not as radical as might be supposed in view of official declarations on aid conditionality. Even 
Germany, which increasingly fell apart with France over continuing aid to Lomé, paid between 1998 and 
2003 about €8 to 10 million of bilateral aid to Togo (Kohnert 2011). Net ODA received as % of central 
government expense in Togo from 2004 to 2012 averaged 45% and reached its peak in 2009 with 100%; 
see Table 3 (Annex).  
15
 Interestingly enough, there existed at least four Togolese concentration camps for political detainees, 
situated in the northern parts of the country. Kazaboua, the most notorious, was constructed under 
dubious circumstances with assistance of a pioneer unit of the German Army, under the cover of bilateral 
military co-operation and armament grant in 1984, which triggered a controversial discussion in the 
German Bundestag (Bonn) in 1985. During the Sovereign National Conference of 1991 and the 
investigations of the Togolese Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR, 2012) later-on this torture 
camp, as well as other misguided development projects like the infamous 30,000 ha ‘model’ cattle ranch 
‘Béna-Development‘, a kind of German PPP, had been singled out for especially cruel treatment of political 
prisoners and the local population (Kohnert 2011; CVJR-2012).  
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Any efforts by the mostly clandestine opposition to expand freedom and democratic 
participation in the country were undermined. In July 1991, the Second Wind of Change in 
SSA and the successful democratization efforts in neighboring Benin, stimulated 
representatives of all social strata in Lomé to follow suit. They organized a Sovereign 
National Conference that established  a general account to rehabilitate the political past and 
to organize an new political order. The assembly opted for a semi-presidential system and 
elected an interim prime minister. Four months later, however, President Eyadéma ordered 
the army to attack the interim government. He re-established his dictatorial power which 
lasted up to his death in 2005 when his son Faure Gnassingbé was installed by the military as 
his successor. The latter, known as modernizer, continued despite some democratic reforms 
almost unabated a kind of enlightened autocratic rule up to date, again assisted by the 
international donor community mainly out of overriding reasons of regional stability and 
combat of terrorism (Kohnert 2015).  
Aid guidelines of donors that underwent considerable changes over time, were readily 
recognized formally by Lomé but outwitted by the seesaw policy of the ruling regime, 
facilitated by overriding considerations of global players in regional stability and security 
(Kohnert 2015; 2011). In view of growing deficits in the democratization process and the 
apparent unwillingness of the regime to give in, donors tried to bypass state authority by 
assisting national CSOs directly from 1993 to 2007. However, the coalition of political 
opposition and Civil Society Organizations to overcome autocratic rule utterly failed both 
due to the lack of unity and internal strife among the oppositional coalition and to the 
inconsistent and wagering aid-policies of major donors, as proved lastly during the 
presidentials of 2015.  
 
b. The development of civic agency in Togo  
For more than four decades, since the beginning of Gnassingbé rule in 1967, about 88% of 
Togolese citizens experienced no political alternation in their life but autocratic rule of just 
one family at the commanding heights of political, military and economic power of their 
country (Caritas France 2015:8). For an impartial view on the development potential of civic 
agency in Togo it is decisive to keep this always in mind.  
The Gnassingbé regime was based on three pillars of power and repression: first, 
military and security services, organized like a Praetorian guard, as well as pro-Eyadéma 
militias, all dominated by members of the ethnic group of the president (Kabiyé). The 
military was upgraded with foreign assistance, notably of France, within the framework of 
secret pacts of mutual assistance. The second pillar was a politically instrumentalized occult 
belief system (occult despotism, witchcraft-violence against opponents), crucial but 
unfortunately mostly ignored by aid agencies, not least because it is usually hidden from 
outside observers, and the third, the political instrumentalization of traditional chieftaincies, 
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local religious leaders and the provincial administration (prefects). In addition, the regime 
occupied the commanding heights of the economy in order to assure its financial base.  
At least three peak-waves of democratic protest in Togo have been identified: 1991, 
2005, 2010 by Franklin (2014) to which we have to add the most recent during the 
presidential of 2014-15 (Kohnert 2015). Whereas civic agency gathered a strong momentum 
in BF and finally overthrew the autocratic ruler, it was frustrated after repeated but 
powerless ‘democratic revolutions’ against the despotic Gnassingbé-Clan. As shown above, 
double-talk and misguided aid policy was one important, though hitherto neglected cause of 
this failure.  
This notwithstanding, there are additional domestic reasons, mainly situated in the 
realm of the development potential of social capital, informal political institutions and CSO 
which could act in principle as counter-balancing political force. However, they were 
thwarted effectively by the Eyadéma regime as will be shown in detail below. Yet, we should 
bear in mind that both external and internal factors are closely interrelated. Donor’s 
reluctance over decades to implement aid-conditionality effectively was a precondition to 
enable the regime to consolidate its power over political and civic opposition. 
The history of informal political and civil society institutions in Togo shows a rich base 
of ‘traditional’ as well as ‘modern’ institutions that participate actively on all levels of the 
society as will be shown in focusing on the five most important ones. The most powerful 
outcome of people’s participation so far was the Sovereign National Conference of 1991 
mentioned above. However, because the visions of this conference were dashed shortly 
afterwards by violent political oppression of the dictatorial Eydéma regime up to 2005, 
similar social initiatives were difficult to be re-established (Kohnert 2015: 15).  
Firstly, there are traditional political institutions, like the earth priests (chef de terre) 
and traditional chieftaincies that still wield an extraordinary power on village-level. They are 
even recognized as guardians of tradition and customary law by the Constitution. However, 
the role of traditional chiefs was adapted in decades of despotism to the needs of the ruling 
elite by the politics of ‘authenticity’ in the 1970s, i.e. the reference to (re-invented) 
traditional rules, and by the forced ‘alignment’ of chiefs in the National Confederation of 
traditional rulers of Togo (l'Union nationale des chefs traditionnels du Togo) created in 
August 1969. In addition, the legitimacy crisis left behind by decades of despotic rule and 
growing corruption in a fragile economic environment as well as the lacking decentralization 
policy and local elections postponed time and again by the government (the last being held 
in 1983) created barriers to good government and a transparent administration on the local 
level.  
The same holds for traditional religious leaders, the second most important 
institution. African traditional religions, notably vodun in the Southern regions and occult 
belief systems all over Togo, still play an important role in everyday life. Their priests often 
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act as estimated conflict mediators at the local level 16. However, the instrumentalization of 
African religions and occult belief systems by the ruling powers for political means and 
political motivated witch-hunts as proofed so cunningly by the defunct Eyadéma regime 
(Kohnert 2011), discredited many religious leaders. Nevertheless, occult African belief 
systems are still an underlying current of all religious beliefs in Togo regardless of its spiritual 
orientation. Its instrumentalization is not restricted to the person of late General Eyadéma, 
nor to the ideological underpinning and legitimization of the worldly power of the head of 
state in general, but encompasses nearly all levels of public administration from the top, 
down to the level of simple district heads (Kohnert 2015: 6-7).  
Thirdly, student organizations consider themselves as political avant-garde and act 
accordingly. Up to 2006, most of them were intimately linked to the ruling party. Thus, the 
High Council of Students’ Associations and Movements (HACAME) degenerated into a pro-
government militia which actively supported the incumbent’s bloody ‚enthronement’ in 
2005. Since 2010, oppositional student organizations came to the fore which staged periodic 
anti-government demonstrations in the universities of Lomé and Kara. Their leaders suffered 
political persecution.  
Fourthly, there are a large number of labour unions in Togo, but none of them has 
the strength or capacity to shape legislation. At least the unions succeeded in convincing the 
government to continue paying subsidies for fuel and some staple food items as well as 
fertilizer so as to avoid a serious social crisis and political upheaval. Besides, there exist 
numerous professional representations of traders (notably the renown wealthy women 
cloth traders of Lomé, the ‘Nana Benz’), farmers, lawyers, judges etc. However, they are 
either biased and close to the former unity party RPT/UNIR or of little political influence.  
Last, but not least civil society organisations (CSO) mushroomed with the democratic 
renewal of the early 1990s. According to informed estimates there existed about 2,000 CSO 
in 2012, of which 638 were registered NGOs. Since 1986 the government promotes its 
federation within FONTGO (Féderation des Organisations Non-Gouvernmentales au Togo, 
144 members in 2014). However, many CSOs were created in the 1990s on the initiative of 
the Gnassingbé regime in order to influence non-partisan political expression in Togo and to 
circumvent the suspension of development cooperation with state institutions in view of 
flagrant human rights violations. This is the reason why some of the most credible NGOs are 
not represented by this federation. Therefore, two concurrent umbrella organizations were 
formed: the UONGTO (Union des ONG du Togo, 124 members, 2014) in 1996 and in May 
2012 the FNRRT (Fédération Nationale des Réseaux Régionaux du Togo). However, many, if 
not most CSO are covered job and income generating measures of their founders (so-called 
                                                          
16 Ni-Mantche, the grand master of the vodun goodness Maman Kole in Southern Togo was counted in 
October 2014 by Jeune Afrique in an non-exhaustive ranking of the 15 most influent religious leaders in 
Africa as one of the most celebrated African vodun priests. 
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‘ONG-valises’). Their activities are mostly focused on Lomé and the Southern regions. Their 
target-groups, especially the poor and underprivileged, including women, are rarely allowed 
adequate rights of participation or self-determination 17.  
To be sure, this is not to put the blame for the lack of performance of Togolese CSO 
entirely on misguided aid policies and the repression by the autocratic regime. Besides there 
exist also self-inflicted failures. Above all civil society organizations tried to challenge the 
Gnassingbé regime in close cooperation with opposition parties 18 mainly in opting for 
political alternation (changement, was their undifferentiated Leitmotif) and not for 
establishing unbiased democratic institutions that could be considered as sustainable base 
for a flourishing democracy (Okonofua 2015:95-96). In addition, internal strife and undue 
competition if not distrust of different clusters of the civil society contributed to its 
weakness.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Building up civic agency is crucial for a sustainable process of democratization. The 
development potential of civic agency in African countries and elsewhere depends on 
internal and external variables which are interdependent. The domestic factor rests to a 
large extent on the type and degree of repression as explained above as well as on the 
capacity of citizens to overcome fault lines of ethnicity, class, gender, religion and partisan 
politics in their own country. However, this domestic capacity can be enhanced also by 
global developments and networks like the spread of internet and mobile phones even in 
remote regions all over Africa, by international advocacy networks and last but not least by 
motivating successful protest movements in neighboring countries, like the Arab spring or 
the wave of Sovereign National Conferences in SSA in the early 1990s. Yet, civic agency can 
be diminished also, e.g. by trans-national waves of xenophobia like in Southern Africa in 
recent times and by despotic rulers who successfully apply a stick and carrot policy to divide 
                                                          
17 Yet, there exist a handful of viable and independent national NGOs like ACAT-Togo (Action des Chrétiens 
pour l’Abolition de la Torture), which won the Human Rights price of the French Republic in 1997, the HR-
organization LTDH (Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l’Homme), and the GF2D (Groupe de Réflexion et d´Action 
Femmes, Démocratie et Développement) concerned with gender equality. Some of them co-operate with 
political parties in broad antigovernment movements like the CST. 
18 e.g. the broad opposition alliance Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST), founded in April 2012), which was 
composed of civil-society organizations and political parties, led by the main opposition party Alliance 
Nationale pour le Changement (ANC), and the rainbow coalition of the moderate opposition ‘Arc-en-ciel’, 
originally meant to complement the CST, which merged later-on to create a common opposition alliance 
Combat pour l’Alternative Politique en 2015 (CAP 2015) for the presidentials of 2015. 
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their opponents. Because of a lack of sustainable solidarity and a united front CSOs thus are 
likely to become involuntary allies of the regime they want to contest.  
Foreign influence on the development capacity of civic agency, both positive and 
negative, is often indirect and accidentally, but not necessarily less effective. In many cases it 
is not visible at first sight, notably when it comes to its long-term effects. More often than 
not, it slips in under the radar screen of even well-intended aid-donors because the 
institutional memory both of development agencies and related research and evaluation 
institutions is usually quite short (Bierschenk / Elwert / Kohnert 1993). In contrast, the 
aftermath of misguided development policies and failed development projects remains 
often embodied in the memory of the local population concerned over generations. 
However, its long-lasting impact is considered by the donors only occasionally if at all.  
In this study it is argued that the long-term effects of donor’s double-talk, who openly 
promote democracy and freedom but covertly follow overriding hidden interest, are a 
neglected source of failure of civic protest and democratic revolutions in autocratic regimes. 
The differing outcome of ‘democratic revolutions’ in Togo and Burkina Faso – both ‘aid 
darlings’ for decades - serves to substantiate this thesis.   
Since colonial times BF has a long tradition of successful civil resistance to undemocratic 
rulers. This heritage even spread into the military which made for the Sankarist revolution in 
the 1980s. The latter, although short-lived and abated with assistance of foreign countries, 
still impacts positively on civic agency, up to the ‘democratic revolution’ in 2014 which 
ousted Compaoré after 27 years of autocratic rule. The impetus of democratic collective 
action prevailed despite countervailing foreign intervention over decades, i.e. the 
unwavering support of major donors for Compaoré, above all the former colonial power 
France.  
Togo’s civil society, on the other hand, was scared and suppressed over the past four 
decades by the Gnassingbé-regime with multiple, closely interacting means of repression, 
including the occult dimension. Nevertheless, the regime was consolidated by major aid-
donors over decades as shown above. Legitimacy of the regime was derived largely 
externally, not by its own electorate. So far, about 88% of the living population did not 
experience political alternance in their life-time. The regime was based on four pillars of 
power and repression: first, military and security services, organized like a Praetorian guard, 
as well as pro-Eyadéma militias, all dominated by members of the ethnic group of the 
president (Kabiyé). The military was upgraded with foreign assistance, notably of France, 
within the framework of secret pacts of mutual assistance. The second pillar was a politically 
instrumentalized occult belief system (occult despotism, witchcraft-violence against 
opponents), and the third, the political instrumentalization of traditional chieftaincies, local 
religious leaders and the provincial administration (prefects). Fourthly, the regime occupied 
the commanding heights of the economy in order to assure its financial base. 
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It could reasonably been argued that elements of all four pillars of power of the Togolese 
case were present as foundation of autocratic rule of Campaoré as well. However, in this 
paper it is argued, first that the difference of degree and time span of oppression between 
Togo and BF is not just a quantitative one but transmutes to a qualitative difference 19. Thus, 
it makes a decisive distinction, that the Togolese people has practical no lifetime experience 
other than political repression nor a cherished revolutionary tradition like the Burkina Faso 
electorate. And secondly, the occult despotism of Eyadéma, deeply engrained in the society 
by its interlinkage with the politically instrumentalized traditional chieftaincies, reinforced 
and extended oppression also to the spiritual sphere present on all levels of the local 
administration 20. The demons which he called are not so fast to exorcize, even not by a 
‘modernizer’ like his son Faure Gnassingbé, which has profound effects on the motivation of 
the population to develop civic agency as well. 
 
To sum it up: Whereas civic agency gathered a strong momentum in BF and finally overthrew 
the autocratic ruler, it was systematically frustrated over decades and therefore resulted 
only in repeated but unsustainable ‘democratic revolutions’ against the despotic 
Gnassingbé-Clan. As shown above, double-talk and misguided aid policy was one important, 
though hitherto neglected cause of this failure. A systematic and holistic consideration is 
necessary for an unbiased evaluation of this hidden adverse impact of aid on collective 
action at the grass-roots. Therefore, a rethinking of temporal and disciplinary ‘fault lines’ in 
development politics as well as in development studies is essential. 
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Annex 
 
Tabel 1: Net ODA received (% of GNI) Burkina Faso and Togo: 1980 – 2013 
Country / 
year 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 av 
BF 10.9 12.2 12.1 11.4 12.6 12.2 13.2 11.4 11.0 10.2 11,6 
Togo 8.2 6.8 9.8 15.4 15.9 15.3 16.7 10.1 15.4 15.2 12,9 
 
year 
(cont.) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 av 
BF 10.6 13.4 19.4 20.2 n.a 23.0 16.1 15.1 14.3 13.2 16,1 
Togo 16.2 12.7 13.4 7.9 n.a 15.1 10.8 8.5 8.2 4.7 10,8 
 
year 
(cont.) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 av 
BF 6.9 14.6 13.8 12.9 13.4 12.7 15.4 14.1 12.0 13.0 11.8 9.3 10.0 8.1 12,0 
Togo 5.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.4 4.0 3.7 4.9 11.8 17.8 14.6 17.0 7.3 6.0 7,6 
 
Legend: Net ODA as % of GNI not available for 1994, 2014; Western ODA to Togo was officially suspended 
from 1993 to 2008 because of HR-violations. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015 
 
Table 2: Net ODA received as % of central government expense in BF (2002 – 2012) 
year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 av 
BF 122,7 122,9 116,0 110,6 122,2 101,4 98,8 102,4 99.3 74.7 71.4 112.1 
Legend: not available for 1980-2001, 2013-15;  
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015 
 
Table 3: Net ODA received as % of central government expense in Togo (2002 – 2012) 
year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 av 
Togo n.a. n.a. 21,9 24,3 20,9 28,0 75,4 100,5 88.3 92.7 34.3 45.2 
Legend: not available for 1980-2003, 2013-15;  
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015 
 
 
 
Table 4: Net ODA received Togo: 1970 – 1979 (% of GNI, Mio, current US $) 
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year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979   
ODA 17,00 19,30 21,60 25,80 38,60 41,70 42,80 63,90 101,90 n.a   
GNI 276 282 320 392 527 617 659 732 854    
ODA,% GNI 6,15 6,80 6,75 6,58 7,32 6,76 6,5 8,73 11,9    
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015 
 
Table 5: Togo - ODA and Aid Received, 1960 – 1980 (Mio., Current US $) 
year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 av 
Togo 0.03 2.53 3.56 5.70 13.82 12.43 10.88 12.87 18.92 17.49 17.00 8.83 
 
year 
(cont.) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
av 
Togo 19.32 21.65 25.83 38.69 41.78 42.93 64.19 102.47 109.69 90.98 55.75 
Source: Earthtrends, World Resources Institute (WRI), 2015;  
 
 
 
 
